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HISTORIOGRAPHIC VICES 
I, LOGICAL ATTRIBUTION 
BY KENNETH 0, MAY, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO 
SUMMARIES 
In the first of this series is considered the fallacious 
attribution of results that are logical antecedents or 
consequents of established knowledge. 
Ce premier essai d'une s&ie discutte l'attribution 
illusoire des r&ultats qui sont cons&quents ou ant&& 
dents des connaissances bien 6tablies. 
Editors are well situated to observe offenses against good 
scholarship, since much of their work consists in crime preven- 
tion. This is particularly true in a hybrid discipline such as 
history of mathematics in which most practitioners are, or have 
recently been, professionals in at most one of the fields. The 
collection here begun is miscellaneous -- to be continued as I 
observe, recall, or retrieve examples. Since the purpose is not 
to correct published errors and still less to pillory individuals, 
examples are given without attribution or in fictitious form 
similar to the original. Correspondence is invited. I thank 
Gregory Moore for comments on a draft. 
A canonical deduction schema for logical attribution is: 
(1) 
X knew A. 
B is a logical consequence of A. 
Therefore, X knew B. 
Since mathematicians know how hard it is to find nontrivial 
consequences, such a schema is rarely explicit. But it is 
surprising how often a writer discovers A in the works of X, 
practices his mathematical skills to derive B, and then delight- 
edly credits X with B. 
For example, a medievalist discovers in a fifteenth century 
work a verbal formula for approximating the sine by a product 
that can be calculated for an arbitrarily large number of 
factors. When expressed in modern notation, this formula does 
not immediately suggest a series, but well chosen manipulations 
reduce it to the first n terms of Taylor’s series for the sine. 
The author does not argue explicitly that the fifteenth century 
mathematician must have known Taylor’s series or that he even 
had any concept of infinite series, nor does he present any 
evidence that he could have done the manipulations, but he 
blandly asserts that Taylor’s series was known 200 years before 
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NeWtOn. The conclusion is doubly unfortunate, not only untenable 
but distracting attention for more interesting questions, e.g. 
how was such a good result obtained without the methods of cal- 
culus, and what does it tell us about mathematics in terms 
meaningful at that time and place? 
A more plausible version of (1) is obtained by replacing the 
middle term by: 
(2) B is an obvious logical consequence Of A. 
But this is only slightly more likely to lead to a correct 
conclusion, because "obviousness" is as time-tagged as every 
other aspect of mathematics. This is true even within the 
development of an individual. What mathematician has not had 
the experience of suddenly finding obvious what for a long time 
had been unclear, doubtful, or even unsuspected! We have the 
familiar anecdote attributed to S. Lefschetz and others. The 
hero is lecturing to a seminar. "Now the following result is 
obvious. Hmmm. Or is it? Hmmm. Excuse me, I'll be back in 
a moment." He leaves. Twenty minutes pass. He returns. "Yes, 
it's obvious!" 
One sees instances of (1) with the middle term replaced by: 
(3) A is a logical consequence of B. 
Again, since it is commonplace that unconscious assumptions 
have always abounded in mathematics, that the antecedents of 
propositions are potentially infinite, and that knowledge of a 
result always precedes its placement in a logical structure, 
this schema is not explicitly used or asserted. But some writers 
cannot resist the temptation of imposing on the past the logical 
structures with which they are familiar. 
A famous logician once wrote: "We are told that Thales knew 
that the angle subtended at the circumference by the diameter 
of a circle.is a right angle. It is difficult to see how he 
could know this, unless he had given some sort of deductive 
proof of it." Why difficult? At that time a great deal of 
geometric knowledge had accumulated without the construction of 
any deductive synthesis. Indeed the deductive organization of 
mathematics by Euclid and his predecessors presupposed such 
knowledge. The theorem in question could easily be discovered 
and verified with a craftsman's square, in the course of other 
practical activities, or through experience with geometrical 
drawings. 
A well known controversy based on fallacy (3) is the extended 
discussion of how the Egyptians could have found the correct 
formula for the volume of a frustrum of a square pyramid [May 
1973, 4871. Some have argued that it is a great mystery, since 
Max Dehn's famous result of 1900 showed that they could not 
have proved the rule without resort to methods developed only 
much later. But one can take this seriously only if he imagines 
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that mathematicians find results by deduction, or is ignorant 
of the empirical basis of Egyptian mathematics. They could have 
found the rule in many ways, e.g. from their experience in 
building pyramids and/or from considering the special case of 
the six congruent pyramids with bases the faces of a cube and 
common apex at the center, in each case supplemented by some 
generalization and algebraic manipulation of which their capabi- 
lity is established. 
These vices arise, as do most of those I shall discuss, from 
looking at mathematics as a timeless, static, logical structure 
gradually revealed to man, instead of as a historically evolving 
human phenomenon. Of course, the historian must for some pur- 
poses make inferences from directly documented knowledge to 
what is plausibly inferred, but valid argement for such infer- 
ences cannot rest on logical connections alone. It requires 
historical analysis of the knowledge, thinking, and environment 
of the persons involved. Moreover , it is such analysis that is 
the distinctive task of the historian. The mathematicians’ 
craft is to trace the formal logical connections. 
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